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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BARGAINING AWAY FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS IN LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Bolden v. SEPTA (1991)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that public employee
unions, functioning as the exclusive bargaining agent for union members, could consent to future drug testing of member employees 2 even if
1. 953 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2281 (1992).
2. Id. at 825-29. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning,
see infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
In Bolden, the Third Circuit decided four additional issues raised during and
after the district court trial. First, the court held that the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority (SEPTA) was not entitled to sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution even though
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created SEPTA. Id. at 812-21. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens of
subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In determining whether
SEPTA was a "state" for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, the Bolden court
relied on Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989), which denied Eleventh Amendment immunity
to a transportation entity similar to SEPTA. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 818-21.
In Fitchik, the Third Circuit utilized three factors to determine whether an
agency like New Jersey Transit (NJT) qualified as the "state" for immunity purposes: 1) source of payment for a judgment against the agency, 2) status of the
agency under state law and 3) the agency's autonomy from the state. Fitchik, 873
F.2d at 659-63. The Bolden court applied the three factors set forth in Fitchik to
determine if SEPTA qualified as the "state" for Eleventh Amendment immunity
purposes. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 818-21. According to the first factor, if a legal
judgment against the agency in question would necessarily be paid from the
state treasury, this fact would be a strong indication that the agency sued was an
"alter ego" of the state. Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659-60. Applying the first factor,
the Third Circuit in Bolden found that SEPTA, like NJT, could pay legal damages
by raising fares. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819. Therefore, SEPTA would not necessarily have to tap state treasuries to pay for adverse judgments, a factor weighing
heavily against Eleventh Amendment protection for SEPTA. Id. at 819-20. Addressing the second Fitchik factor, the agency's state law status, the Bolden court
found that SEPTA, like NJT, possesses attributes associated with state sovereignty. Id. at 820. These attributes include: 1) exemption from state property
taxes, 2) certain powers of eminent domain and 3) state-like treatment under
state tort law because SEPTA is subject to the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity
statute. Id Therefore, SEPTA's status under Pennsylvania law weighs slightly
in favor of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. Applying the last Fitchik factor,
the Bolden court found that SEPTA enjoys more autonomy from the state than
NJT-SEPTA's actions are not subject to gubernatorial veto and the state has
less representation on SEPTA's board of directors. Id. Therefore, SEPTA is
slightly more autonomous than NJT, and the autonomy factor weighs against
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the drug testing constituted an unreasonable search. 3 The Bolden court
immunity. Id. Because the totality of the Fitchik factors weighs at least as heavily
against immunity for SEPTA as it does for NJT, the Third Circuit held that
SEPTA is not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 821.
In addition to determining that SEPTA was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from lawsuit, the Third Circuit held that SEPTA's drug
testing of Bolden was unreasonable. Id. at 821-24. For a discussion of the
Bolden court's decision concerning this issue, see infra note 3.
Next, the Bolden court rejected SEPTA's assertion that Bolden consented to
the search by knowingly submitting to the drug test. Id. at 824-25. The court
rejected SEPTA's consent argument because "the evidence showed that Bolden
submitted to drug testing without voicing any objection, not because he was
truly willing to undergo the test, but because he understood that the test was
compulsory and that the alternative to submission was loss of his job." Id. at
825.
Finally, the Third Circuit held that the trial court correctly dismissed
Bolden's request for punitive damages. Id. at 829-31. The Third Circuit relied
on the United States Supreme Court's holding in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). Bolden, 953 F.2d at 830-31. In City of Newport,
the Court analyzed the history and policy of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the statute under
which Bolden was suing SEPTA for violation of his constitutional rights). 453
U.S. at 263-70. The Court reasoned that when the predecessor statute of
§ 1983's was enacted in 1871, punitive damages against municipalities were virtually unanimously denied. Id. at 263. According to the Court, if Congress
wanted to allow punitive damages under the predecessor to § 1983, it would
have specifically provided for punitive damages. Id. However, Congress did not
abolish this immunity. Id. at 263-64.
In addition, the Court held that policy considerations weighed against allowing punitive damages. Id. at 267-70. The Court reasoned that punitive damages serve to deter future wrongdoing. Id. at 267. However, the Court stated
that punitive damages against municipalities would not deter wrongdoing because the damages would be paid by the public, not the wrongdoer. Id.
Based on City of Newport, the Bolden court extended municipal immunity to
SEPTA by reasoning that: 1) entities like SEPTA were considered immune from
punitive damages and 2) punitive damages against SEPTA would not necessarily
deter future wrongdoing by SEPTA officials. Bolden, at 830-31. In addition,
other means of deterring violations against SEPTA officials existed, including
personal suits against the officials. Id. at 831.
3. The Third Circuit held that SEPTA's drug testing of Bolden was unreasonable. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 821-24. The Bolden court followed the holdings of
two recent United States Supreme Court cases, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and its companion case, National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Bolden, 953 F.2d at 821-22. In
Skinner, the Court held that drug testing of railroad employees was reasonable
and therefore not violative of the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. 489 U.S.
at 627-28. First, the employees' privacy interests were diminished by their involvement in a regulated industry. Id. Second, the government had a compelling interest in ensuring safety. Id. In Von Raab, the Court used the Skinner
balancing test to determine that drug testing of federal agents involved in drug
interdiction was also reasonable. 489 U.S. at 670-72. Using the Skinner balancing test, the Third Circuit rejected SEPTA's claim that it had a compelling interest in drug testing Bolden to ensure his safety and the safety of others. Bolden,
953 F.2d at 823-24. The court found that Bolden's custodial duties did not implicate anyone's safety. Id. Therefore, SEPTA lacked a compelling interest that
would make its testing of Bolden reasonable and non-violative of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
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based its decision on United States Supreme Court cases that recognized a third party's ability (in limited contexts) to consent to a search of
another individual. 4 The Bolden court further supported its decision by
holding: 1) a union's ability to consent to drug testing of union members stems from the union's position as sole bargaining agent in contractual matters involving union members, 5 and 2) a union's consent to
searches under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution of union members through drug testing parallels the interferences
with the First Amendment rights of individuals that are inherent in organized labor. 6 As authority for these holdings, the Bolden court drew
upon cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Sixth
and Ninth Circuits to establish the ability of unions to consent to Fourth
Amendment searches through collective bargaining agreements. 7 The
Third Circuit then extended unions' consent powers beyond the actual
collective bargaining agreement to dispute resolution situations. 8 The
court reasoned that even if a collective bargaining agreement lacked express drug testing provisions, the union had the power, through established procedures of interpreting the agreement, 9 to determine whether
the agreement impliedly permitted drug testing.' 0
Section II of this Casebrief provides a background on the law concerning: 1) the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to employee
drug testing," 2) unions' ability to consent to Fourth Amendment
4. The Supreme Court has recognized the constitutionality of third party
consent to the search of another individual's property when the third party is an
agent of the individual or has authority over the place searched. For a discussion of these Supreme Court cases, see infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's application of these cases in
Bolden, see infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the power of unions to negotiate contracts on behalf
of its members, see infra note 30 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Third Circuit's application of this concept to the Bolden case, see infra note 86
and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the ability of unions to interfere with their members'
First Amendment rights, see infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. For a
more detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of this issue, see infra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
7. For a more detailed analysis of the First, Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases
concerning drug testing, see infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the Third Circuit's application of these cases in Bolden, see
infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
8. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 828-29.
9. These interpretive procedures include arbitration and grievance settlements on behalf of the union's employee member. Id.
10. For a more detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the
power of unions to interpret collective bargaining agreements in dispute settlements, see infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches to employee drug testing, see infra notes 1923 and accompanying text.
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searches,' 2 and 3) unions' ability to consent to Fourth Amendment
searches of its members. 13 Section III of this Casebrief summarizes the
procedural setting and facts of the Bolden case. 1 4 Finally, section IV of
this Casebrief analyzes the Third Circuit's holdings and reasoning in
Bolden concerning the ability of unions to consent to the drug testing of
their members. 15
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Drug Testing as a Fourth Amendment Search

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees an individual's right to be free from unreasonablesearches. 16 In general, courts consider searches without either the consent of the
individual or a valid search warrant to be unreasonable. 17 Courts have
recognized, however, a narrow class of exceptions under which a search
is reasonable when the importance of the government interest in conducting the search outweighs the intrusion upon the individual's
rights. 18

Generally, courts have recognized that employee drug tests are
searches implicating the employee's Fourth Amendment rights.' 9 Nev12. For a discussion of the ability to consent to Fourth Amendment
searches, see infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the ability of unions to consent to Fourth Amendment searches of their members, see infra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
14. For a summary of the procedural setting and facts of Bolden, see infra
notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
15. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's holding and reasoning in Bolden
concerning the ability of unions to consent to the drug testing of their members,
see infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
16. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the Place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) ("[E]xcept in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper
consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967))).
18. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 719-20; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
341 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Camara, 387 U.S. at
536-37. The Court created "special needs" exceptions to deal with situations in
which the warrant requirement is unsuitable. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 720. For
example, the Fourth Amendment does not require a search warrant when obtaining the warrant would likely frustrate the purpose of the search. Camara, 387
U.S. at 533. In T.L.O., the Court held that obtaining a warrant for administrative
searches of school property would interfere with the swift discipline procedures
needed in schools. 469 U.S. at 340.
19. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
The Supreme Court held: "Because it is clear that the collection and testing of
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ertheless, several courts have held that employee drug tests are constitutional when the employee has a diminished expectation of privacy and
the government has a significant interest in testing the individual. 20 The
Third Circuit has limited the application of this balancing test to administrative searches, 2 1 but has retained a similar analytical approach for
determining the reasonableness of random drug testing plans. 2 2 If a
search is reasonable under this analytical approach, it does not implicate
urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we
agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
In Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department, 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989), the Third Circuit recognized that compulsory drug testing of police officers implicated Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
at 1143. Similarly, the court had earlier held that compulsory drug testing of
jockeys constituted searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986
(1986).
20. In National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), the
Supreme Court stated: "[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
government needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary
to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion ....
Id. at 665-66. In Skinner, the Court found that a
railroad worker had a diminished expectation of privacy because he worked in a
highly-regulated, safety-sensitive industry. 489 U.S. at 618-21. Further, the
government's interest in safety was compelling. Id. at 628-29. Therefore, the
drug testing was reasonable and not violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
633-34. Similarly, in Shoemaker, the Third Circuit found that jockeys had a diminished expectation of privacy because they participated in a highly-regulated
industry and that the state had a strong interest in assuring the public of the
integrity of the industry. 795 F.2d at 1142-43. Therefore, the drug testing of
jockeys was constitutional. Id.
21. In Shoemaker, the Third Circuit recognized an exception to the warrant
requirement for searches conducted under an administrative inspection scheme
in closely regulated industries. 795 F.2d at 1142. The court found daily
breathalyzer tests and random urine testing constitutional under the administrative search exception. Id. at 1143. For other examples of constitutional administrative searches, see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05 (1981) (searches
of coal mining property); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972)
(searches of gun selling establishments); Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n Local
318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133, 136-41 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989) (urinalysis and breathalyzer testing of police officers).
22. Transportation Workers' Union Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transit
Auth., 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 492 U.S. 902, aff'd, 884 F.2d 709
(3d Cir. 1989). In Transportation Workers' Union, the Third Circuit stated:
We explained that a drug testing program will come within the administrative search exception if it is (1) based on a strong state interest in
determining whether employees are using illegal substances; and (2)
directed at an industry that is pervasively regulated in such a manner
that employees' justifiable privacy expectations are diminished.
863 F.2d at 1116-17 (citing Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 1988)). The TransportationWorkers' Union court further stated that "administrative searches are merely one
illustration of the application of the reasonableness standard arising out of the
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the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual. 23
B.

Consent to Fourth Amendment Searches

Although the Fourth Amendment protects an individual from unreasonable searches by the government, an individual can waive this
protection by voluntarily consenting to a search. 2 4 In addition, courts
have recognized the ability of third parties to consent to the search of
another individual if the third party is an agent of the searched individual 2 5 or has a substantial interest in the search.2 6 Even if the third-party
agent lacks actual authority to consent, a search is constitutionally permissible if the searching party had a reasonable belief that the third
party possessed actual authority. 2 7 However, the Supreme Court has
held that "the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be
eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic
doctrines of 'apparent authority.' "28
C.

Union Consent to Member Drug Testing

The law addressing the ability of an employee union to consent to
'careful balancing of governmental and private interests.' " 863 F.2d at 1117
(quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722-23 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
23. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but
only against unreasonable searches and seizures.").
24. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (individual consent required to waive Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable
searches).
25. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 940
(1964) (recognizing ability of agent to consent on behalf of principal); United

States v. House, 524 F.2d 1035 (3d Cir. 1975) (recognizing tax accountant as
agent of taxpayer who could consent to search of taxpayer's records by Internal
Revenue Service).
26. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974) ("[T]he voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly
occupied is valid against the co-occupant .... "); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731,
740 (1969) (holding that cousin who shared duffel bag with defendant could

consent to search of bag).
27. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182-89 (1990). The belief that a

third party had authority to consent can be reasonable even if such belief is not
factually accurate. Id. at 185-86. The Rodriguez Court further stated:

As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure,
determination of consent to enter must "be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . .
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' " that the consenting
party had authority over the premises?
Id. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
28. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488. In Stoner, the Supreme Court held that the
search of the defendant's hotel room was unconstitutional because the police
were unreasonable in their belief that the hotel clerk had authority to consent to
a search of the room. Id. at 489-90.
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Fourth Amendment searches of its members is unclear.2 9 Generally,
state labor statutes define a union's role as exclusive bargaining agent
for its members, giving the union power to bind its members through
contractual agreements. 30 Several cases recognize that union membership may permissively impinge upon members' rights under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, particularly freedom of
association. 3 1 However, these cases limit permissible impingement
upon First Amendment rights to situations in which the union and employer are addressing labor-management issues. 32 Therefore, a union
cannot interfere with its members' rights to freely associate in contexts
29. Several cases suggest that a union may consent to the drug testing and
other searches of its members through collective bargaining agreements. See
Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc., 914 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2015 (1991); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv.,
871 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111
(1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989); Utility Workers of Am. v.
Southern Cal. Edison, 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078

(1989). The searches consented to in these cases, however, may not implicate

the employees' Fourth Amendment rights because the searches were reasonable
due to the following factors: 1) the searches promoted a legitimate state interest, 2) the employees had a diminished expectation of privacy because the collective bargaining agreement clearly established the employers' bargained right
to conduct employee searches or 3) the employees had a diminished expectation
of privacy because the consent to the searches was clearly defined as a condition
of employment. For an analysis of these cases, see infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
30. The Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act (PERA) states:
Representatives selected by public employes in a unit appropriate
for collective bargaining purposes shall be the exclusive representative
of all the employes in such unit to bargain on wages, hours, terms and
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employe or a
group of employes shall have the right at any time to present grievances
to their employer and to have them adjusted without the intervention
of the bargaining representative as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining contract then in effect

43

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.606 (1991); see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177
(1967) (stating that "[i]t is now well established that, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees . . . the Union had a statutory duty fairly to
represent all of those employees . . . in its collective bargaining...").
31. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, reh'g denied, 433 U.S. 915
(1977). In Abood, the Supreme Court held that union membership entailed some

restriction on the constitutional rights of employees and in particular may "interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit." Id. at 222. The Court
permitted this interference because the principle of exclusive union representation as a means of promoting labor peace was an important state interest. Id. at
219-20.
32. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984) ("[T]he
test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of. . . exclusive representation of the employees in
dealing with the employer on labor-management issues."). In Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), the Supreme Court also held that a
union's interference with employee rights must be narrowly tailored. Id. at 303.
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outside the traditional scope of the union/employer/employee
33
relationship.
The First, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have suggested that labor unions
may consent to drug testing (or similar searches) of their members
through collective bargaining. In Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.,34 the
First Circuit held that neither the Massachusetts Constitution nor the
United States Constitution granted an employee the absolute right to be
free from employer drug testing.3 5 As part of biennial medical examinations given to truck drivers in compliance with federal highway safety
regulations, Liquid Carbonic began drug testing employee truck drivers. 36 In February, 1986, Liquid Carbonic dismissed Jackson, its employee, after traces of marijuana had been detected in Jackson's urine
37
sample.
The First Circuit dismissed Jackson's state privacy claims, 38 holding
that section 301 of the Labor Relations Act of 194739 preempted the suit
because resolution of the state-law claims required interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement. 40 The court stated that "the dimensions of [Jackson's] cognizable expectation of privacy depend to a great
extent upon the concessions the union made regarding working condi33. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235. In Abood, the Supreme Court held that unions
cannot permissibly interfere with member's constitutional rights for such purposes as support of political candidates or ideological causes. Id.
34. 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988).
35. Id. at 115-16. The Liquid Carbonic court noted that Massachusetts privacy law, both constitutional and statutory, parallels federal constitutional law.
Id. at 115. The First Circuit stated "we find [the U.S. Constitution] does not
secure an absolute right to be free from employer drug testing. Rather, the ordinary case requires that a court attempt to calibrate the proper balance between
an employee's privacy rights and an employer's legitimate concerns." Id.
36. Id. at 112. Liquid Carbonic Corp. employed Jackson as a truck driver,
responsible for hauling pressurized gases that were volatile and often hazardous.
Id. During the time period in question, Jackson was a member of Local 49, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
(Local 49), a party to a collective bargaining agreement with Liquid Carbonic
Corp. Id. Liquid Carbonic added the drug testing procedure to the biennial
medical examinations only after announcing the new drug testing program to its
employees, distributing consent forms and notifying the drivers that "permitting
these tests to be performed was a condition of employment." Id. Jackson signed
the consent form. Id. at 112-13. Neither Jackson nor Local 49 challenged the
drug testing when the corporation announced it. Id. at 112.
37. Id. at 113.
38. Id. Jackson alleged that the drug testing: 1) violated his state and federal constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches, 2) violated state
privacy law and 3) comprised a wrongful discharge under state law because it
was contrary to public policy. Id. The district court granted Liquid Carbonic's
motion to dismiss the suit for failure to state any cognizable claim. Id. Jackson
appealed the dismissal to the First Circuit. Id.
39. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1988).
40. Liquid Carbonic, 863 F.2d at 122.
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tions during collective bargaining."' 4 1 While the Liquid Carbonic court
did not balance Jackson's privacy interests against Liquid Carbonics'
safety concerns, the court clearly stated that the terms of collective bar42
gaining agreements bear heavily on such a balancing.
The Sixth Circuit, in American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 4 3 held that unannounced employee locker searches did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. 4 4 The Sixth Circuit based its holding
on the language of the collective bargaining agreement between the
45
postal workers' union and the United States Postal Service (USPS).

The agreement expressly permitted locker searches under certain conditions. 4 6 In addition, before renting lockers, employees signed a waiver
permitting random, unannounced searches. 4 7 Therefore, the court concluded that the employee had a diminished expectation of privacy in the
locker, rendering the search outside the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment.

48

The Ninth Circuit decided two cases that addressed the union con41. Id. at 119. The Liquid Carbonic court noted two provisions of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time of Jackson's dismissal. Id. at 113,
119. Article XXI of the agreement gave management "the right to post reasonable rules and regulations from time to time ....
" Id. at 113. Article XII made
disputes concerning "the meaning, application, or interpretation of, or compliance with, the provisions of the Agreement subject to mandatory grievance and
arbitration procedures." Id. at 113. The court further stated that "assessment
of Jackson's allegations necessarily involves an in-depth inquiry into the rights
and obligations bestowed by the Agreement. Jackson's privacy claims can only
be resolved by deciding whether the employer's conduct was 'reasonable' under
the labor contract, taking into account the 'expectations of the parties.' " Id. at
119 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 118-19.
43. 871 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 560. In January, 1983, the Columbus Post Office conducted an
employee locker search, which ultimately identified six lockers containing contraband. Id. at 558. The search yielded 582 pieces of mail stored illegally in one
locker, intoxicants in three others, gambling records in a fifth locker and postal
property in a sixth locker. Id. Six members of the American Postal Workers
Union initiated a district court action seeking monetary damages and injunctive
relief, alleging that the defendants violated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment
rights by searching the lockers. Id. at 559. The district court granted judgment
in favor of the defendants. Id.
45. Id. at 560.
46. Id. at 557. The collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time of
the locker searches provided for random locker inspections under the following
conditions: "The employer agrees that, except in matters where there is reasonable cause to suspect criminal activity, a steward or the employee should be
present at any inspection of employees' lockers." Id.
47. Id. Employees renting lockers completed and signed Postal Service
Form 4943, which provided in relevant part: "4. Locker is subject to inspection
at any time by authorized personnel." Id. The employee manual also provided
that all property furnished by the Postal Service was subject to inspection by
authorized personnel. Id. at 557 n.1.
48. Id. at 560 (stating that "in light of the clearly expressed provisions permitting random and unannounced locker inspections ...

the collective class of
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sent issue. 49 In Utility Workers of America v. Southern California Edison,50
the Ninth Circuit recognized that the constitutionality of random drug
testing plans would be determined in part by a concession made by the
union in the collective bargaining agreement. 5 1 In Stikes v. Chevron USA,
Inc.,52 the court again noted that the collective bargaining agreement
would be a determinative factor in whether the searches conducted by
the company were constitutional. 53 It was against the backdrop of the
plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their respective lockers
that was protected by the Fourth Amendment").
49. See Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc., 914 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1990); Utility
Workers of Am. v. Southern Cal. Edison, 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988). In both
Ninth Circuit cases, the plaintiffs brought state-law claims for violation of state
constitutional rights. Stikes, 914 F.2d at 1266; Utility Workers of Am., 852 F.2d at
1085. Both plaintiffs were attempting to avoid removal to federal court under
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because their claims would be
barred for not exhausting available grievance procedures. Stikes, 914 F.2d at
1266-67; Utility Workers of Am., 852 F.2d at 1085. In both cases, the Ninth Circuit
held that § 301 preempted the plaintiffs' claims because the drug testing was
authorized under the collective bargaining agreement. Stikes, 914 F.2d at 126670; Utility Workers of Am., 852 F.2d 1085-87. For a more specific discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
50. 852 F.2d 1083. In September, 1984, Southern California Edison (SCE)
instituted annual drug testing for all employees "seeking 'unescorted access'
into the security area encompassing the San Onofre plant's nuclear reactors."
Id. at 1084. In December, 1986, SCE modified its drug testing procedures to
include random testing of all plant employees. Id.at 1085. SCE implemented
the original drug testing program and the 1986 modification without first bargaining with the Utility Workers of America, Local 246. Id. at 1084-85. Local
246 and two plant employees filed a suit against SCE "alleging that the drug
testing program violated rights guaranteed under the California Constitution to
privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 1085.
51. Id. at 1086. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Resolution of the issue whether Local 246 has bargained away its members' claimed constitutional rights must rest upon Articles VI and X.N
of the collective bargaining agreement, which recognize SCE's right to
manage the plant, to direct the working force, and to implement reasonable safety rules and require their observance. Thus, we find that
Local 246's state-law claims cannot be resolved without reference to
the collective bargaining agreement ....
Id.The Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that no courts have recognized freedom from drug testing as a right that cannot be negotiated away. Id.
52. 914 F.2d 1265. In September, 1984, Chevron instituted, as part of its
safety program, a policy requiring employees to submit to random searches of
their persons and property. Id. at 1266. Stikes, an employee of Chevron, was
dismissed after refusing to permit Chevron representatives to search his car that
was parked in the company lot. Id. Stikes filed suit in state court alleging,
among other things, that Chevron's search policy infringed upon his right to
privacy in violation of the California Constitution. Id.
53. Id. at 1269. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Stikes' right to privacy claim is inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement ....
Here, the district court could not ascertain Stikes' expectations of
privacy at the workplace without considering the conditions of his employment enumerated in the collective bargaining agreement .... By
the same token, it could not assess whether Chevron's search of the car
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First, Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases that the Third Circuit rendered its
decision in Bolden.
III.

FACTS

Russell Bolden worked for the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit
Authority (SEPTA) from 1981 to 1986 as a maintenance custodian. 54 In
August of 1986, Bolden was discharged for conduct unbecoming a
SEPTA employee after an altercation with a fellow worker. 55 Bolden
was a member of the Transportation Workers' Union, Local 234 (Local
234).56 Local 234 filed a grievance on behalf of Bolden, which was
eventually submitted for arbitration pursuant to the collective bargain57
ing agreement.
58
In June of 1987, SEPTA reinstated Bolden with one-half back pay.
During Bolden's absence, SEPTA unilaterally promulgated two orders
relating to employee drug testing. 5 9 Order No. 87-1 called for the random drug testing of certain employees. 60 Order No. 87-2 authorized
drug testing of employees returning from certain absences, including
absences for disciplinary reasons and absences of more than thirty
days. 6 1 In February 1987, the unions representing SEPTA's employees
constituted an unreasonable intrusion without understanding the scope
of Chevron's powers provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement.
Id.

54. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 810.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The arbitration panel ordered Bolden's reinstatement; reinstatement was not the result of a settlement with SEPTA. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Order No. 87-1 "was designed to interrelate educational prevention; treatment and rehabilitation; and monitoring and deterrence. The third
element is embodied in unscheduled random drug testing." Transportation
Workers' Union Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 678 F. Supp. 543,
546 (E.D. Pa. 1989) aff'd, 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 492 U.S. 902
(1989).
61. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 810. Orders 87-1 and 87-2 revised the drug testing
program SEPTA had established in September, 1985 under Order No. 85-1.
Transportation Workers', 678 F. Supp. at 545-46. Order No, 85-1 had "called for
urine or blood testing of employees suspected of being in 'possession of intoxicants or controlled substances,' and which described such possession as 'a dischargeable offense.' " Id. at 545. Orders No. 87-1 and 87-2 proposed "surprise
testing" designed to combat increasing drug-related transit accidents. Id. at
545-46.
Order No. 87-2, the relevant regulation in Bolden, provided:
Any employee returning to work under the following circumstances may be subject to a medical examination, including body fluid
testing: 1. Absences due to physical problems such as injury occurring
on or off duty, and illness; 2. A rehabilitation program for substance
abuse which lasted for any length of time; 3. [A] disciplinary suspension; 4. Any other approved absence from duty in excess of 30 days.
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petitioned for an injunction against the enforcement of Order No. 87-1,
which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted, but the court made no ruling concerning Order No.
87-2.62 In January 1988, the district court upheld the constitutionality
of a revised version of Order No. 87-1 but held Order No. 87-2 unconstitutional. 63 Because Bolden's reinstatement occurred six months
[sic] (excluding a five-week vacation period). Refusal to submit to the
aforementioned medical examination will subject employees to ... disciplinary measures ....
Bolden, 953 F.2d at 810 n.2.
62. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 810. SEPTA Order 87-1 was preliminarily enjoined
"because the program, as evidenced, was excessively intrusive and did not carry
out its objectives. A Fourth Amendment violation appeared, therefore, to be
likely." TransportationWorkers', 678 F. Supp. at 546. Although the district court
opinion stated that Order 87-2 was also enjoined earlier, the preliminary injunction applied only to Order 87-1. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 810 n.3.
63. After the preliminary injunction of Order No. 87-1, SEPTA consulted
with experts to revise the drug testing plan to a form that would pass judicial
scrutiny. Transportation Workers', 678 F. Supp. at 546. The experts considered
such issues as the accuracy of the testing procedures, the positive thresholds, the
randomness of the testing and the existence and functioning of an employee
assistance program. Id. The district court found the revisions sufficient to make
the random testing program under Order No. 87-1 constitutionally permissible.
Id. at 548. Specifically, the district court found that the revised plan ensured
accuracy, minimized privacy interference and was logically related to the purpose of promoting safety through correction and deterrence. Id. The district
court restated the purpose of the testing program: "As set forth in the revised
proposal, the purpose of the program is to enforce a fitness for duty standard.
This standard is applied to a class known as 'operating employees' and is defined
as the absence from one's system of alcohol, drugs and drug metabolites above
specified thresholds." Id. at 546. "Operating employees" are employees in
safety sensitive positions. Id. Specifically, the district court noted that the following positions comprised the class, "operating employees":
1. Engineer, Bus Person, Surface Train Person, Subway-Elevated
Trainperson
2. Conductors and Passenger Attendants
3. Construction Equipment Operators
4. Superintendents of Operations, Towerpersons, Train Dispatchers, and Power Dispatchers
5. Signal Maintainers
6. Power Distribution Maintainers
7. Vehicle, Mechanical, Track and Structural Inspectors
8. Welders
9. Sworn SEPTA police officers
10. Any employee authorized to carry a firearm on duty
11. Instructors and supervisors of the foregoing.
Id. at 547 n.9. Although the district court held the random drug testing program under Order No. 87-1 constitutional, the court held the return to work
drug testing program under Order No. 87-2 unconstitutional. Id. at 551. "With
random testing in place, the need for return to work testing would substantially
be eliminated." Id.
The Third Circuit affirmed both of the district court's holdings. Transportation Workers Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 863 F.2d 1110 (3d
Cir. 1988), vacated, 492 U.S. 902 (1989). The Supreme Court vacated the circuit
court decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court's deci-
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before the final enjoinment of Order No. 87-2, SEPTA subjected Bolden
to a blood test and urinalysis as part of the medical examination required under Order No. 87-2.64 The tests indicated that Bolden had
recently used marijuana. 65 As a result, SEPTA dismissed Bolden for
drug use. 66 Subsequently, Bolden's union, Local 234, filed a grievance. 67 The union's counsel represented Bolden through three levels of
grievance proceedings that culminated in a request for arbitration. 68
Before final arbitration and after Order 87-2 was finally enjoined,
SEPTA and the union settled Bolden's discharge grievance. 69 The settlement gave Bolden full back pay for the drug-related discharge period,
but required him to comply with one of two options, both of which required drug testing. 70 Bolden refused to comply with either option and
consequently did not return to work. 7 1 Bolden then filed a complaint
against SEPTA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking compensatory damages
for lost wages and punitive damages from SEPTA. 72 Bolden claimed
sions in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) and
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299
(1989). Bolden, 953 F.2d at 810 n.4. On remand, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its
earlier decision holding Order 87-1 constitutional. Bolden v. Southeastern Pa.
Transit Auth., 884 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1989). The court did not address the return to work drug testing plan in Order 87-2 because SEPTA abandoned the
issue. Id. at 711 n.l.
64. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 810-11. Bolden submitted to the drug test without
voicing an objection and later testified that taking the test did not create any
problems for him. Id. at 824. SEPTA viewed Bolden's knowing submission as
consent. Id. However, the Third Circuit rejected SEPTA's argument that
Bolden had consented to the drug test. Id. at 825. Rather, the court held that
Bolden's fear of losing his job compelled him to submit to the drug test. Id. For
a more detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of this issue, see supra
note 2.
65. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 811. Bolden moved for the district court to compel
SEPTA and SEPTA's testing agent, SmithKline Bio-Science Laboratories, to
provide an expert witness to testify about drug testing procedures. Bolden v.
Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., No. CIV.A.88-9156, 1989 WL 126239, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 1989). The district court dismissed Bolden's motion because
he failed to demonstrate that the SmithKline's testing or interpretation procedures had any bearing on the constitutionality of the drug testing program. Id.
66. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 811.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The two options that the settlement gave Bolden were to:
1) enter SEPTA's Employee Assistance Program and present evidence
of successful substance abuse treatment, agree to an "aftercare program," submit to a body fluids test before returning to work, and remain subject to unannounced follow-up tests or 2) submit to a body
fluids test and, if he passed, meet with a substance abuse counsellor and
remain subject to unannounced follow-up testing for six months.
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The relevant statute, entitled "Civil action for deprivation of
rights," provides in part:
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that SEPTA violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to an
unreasonable search and seizure and by discharging him without a prior
hearing. 73 Bolden subsequently amended his complaint, adding Local
74
234 as a defendant.
After the district court denied SEPTA's and Bolden's motions for
summary judgment on liability and dismissed Bolden's claim for punitive damages, Bolden's case was tried before a jury. 75 The jury found
that SEPTA had violated Bolden's right to protection from unreasonable searches and awarded damages of $285,000.76 A panel of the Third
Circuit reversed the district court judgment and remanded for entry of
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). At the time of Bolden's civil suit against SEPTA, Local
234 was no longer representing him. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 811.
73. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 811. In its answer to Bolden's complaint, SEPTA
denied the unconstitutionality of the drug test and asserted an affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction based on the settlement of the drug test grievance. Id. In addition, SEPTA filed a third party complaint against Local 234. Id.
SEPTA asserted that the union was liable for any judgment Bolden obtained
against SEPTA because the union negotiated the settlement. Id.
74. Id. "In his amended complaint, Bolden asserted that '[i]f ...Local 234
...had any obligation to represent plaintiff in connection with this illegal drug
testing and illegal discharge, which obligation is denied by plaintiff, then Local
234 participated in a conspiracy with [SEPTA] to deprive plaintiff of his XIVth
Amendment rights.'' Id.
75. Id. In dismissing the motions for summary judgment, the district court
held that issues of material fact existed regarding the reasonableness of the drug
test, whether Bolden consented to the test and whether SEPTA obtained accord
and satisfaction through the settlement. Bolden, 1989 WL 126239, at *1. Regarding liability, the district court specifically stated "it is not clear that the drug
test performed on the plaintiff was a Fourth Amendment violation. The opinion
of this court in [Transportation Workers' Union v. SEPTA] leaves open the constitutionality of governmental return-to-work testing in the absence of a program of
random drug testing." Id. (citation omitted). For a discussion of the district
court's holding in Transportation Workers', see supra note 63 and accompanying
text. The district court granted SEPTA's motion for summary judgment on the
issue of punitive damages. Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., No.
CIV.A.88-9156, 1989 WL 29237, at *1 (E.D. Pa. March 29, 1989). The court
dismissed Bolden's punitive damage claims, holding that SEPTA was a commonwealth entity, and therefore immune to punitive damages judgments. Id. For a
discussion of the Third Circuit's holding regarding this issue, see supra note 2.
The district court also granted Local 234's motion for summary judgment on
SEPTA's third-party complaint. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 811.
76. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 813-14. However, "[tihejury found that SEPTA had
not violated Bolden's right to procedural due process and that Local 234 had
not violated Bolden's constitutional rights by conspiring with SEPTA." Id. at
814. The court denied SEPTA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and SEPTA appealed. Id. Bolden also appealed the dismissal of his claim
for punitive damages. Id.
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judgment in favor of SEPTA. 7 7 Bolden's petition for rehearing was subsequently granted and the judgment of the panel was vacated. 78 These
facts prompted the Third Circuit's reasoning and decision concerning
unions' ability to consent to the drug testing of union members. The
Bolden court's reasoning and decision are analyzed in the following
section.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit first considered whether the settlement agreement between SEPTA and Local 234 precluded Bolden from subsequently bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.79 The court focused
on two questions:
(a) the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of an arbitration award or grievance settlement with respect to a subsequent
claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and (b) the effect for
Fourth Amendment purposes of the union's consent to drug
testing, either during negotiation of a new collective bargaining
agreement or in resolving disputes about the meaning or application of an existing agreement. 80
Relying on United States Supreme Court decisions, the Third Circuit
agreed with Bolden that the grievance settlement did not preclude his
section 1983 claim under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.8 ' The Third Circuit noted, however, that the Supreme Court
cases controlling the res judicata and collateral estoppel questions in
Bolden did not "resolve the question whether, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, a public employee union may consent to future drug testing
'8 2
of the employees it represents."
77. Id. SEPTA based its position on three arguments: 1)the drug test
given to Bolden was reasonable because his duties were safety sensitive and because Bolden consented to the drug test; 2) SEPTA relied on the settlement
agreement it reached with Local 234 as consent to the test; and 3) the $285,000
judgment was contrary to law, excessive and unconscionable. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 825-26.
80. Id. at 825.
81. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that
arbitration decision did not preclude claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that em-

ployer violated constitutional rights of discharged employee); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding same for claim under
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that adverse arbitration decision did not bar
employee from suing under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000h-6). The Third Circuit found the Bolden case consistent with
these cases. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 826.

82. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 826. The court noted that Alexander, Barrentine and
McDonald did not address the issue of whether a union could affect an employee's constitutional right by consenting to an employer's action. Id.
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After establishing that Bolden could properly bring a section 1983
action, the Third Circuit then reviewed the circumstances under which a
third party can validly consent to a search without violating the searched
individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 83 Specifically, the court considered circumstances in which the government obtained valid consent
from persons in agency relationships with the searched parties or from
third parties with substantial interests related to the searches. 8 4 The
Bolden court concluded that these principles supported the position that
a union can validly consent to searches that would otherwise interfere
with an employee's Fourth Amendment rights. 85 The court's review of
the statutory authority of unions to negotiate contractual commitments
86
binding upon their members further supported this conclusion.
Next, the Third Circuit considered Supreme Court precedent recognizing that a union's role as exclusive bargaining agent leads to certain permissible restrictions of union members' First Amendment
rights. 87 The Supreme Court has limited these restrictions to matters
regarding labor-management issues. 88 The Third Circuit reasoned that
if unions could restrict the First Amendment rights of their members
through collective bargaining, unions could also consent to terms impli89
cating union members' Fourth Amendment rights.
In addition, the Third Circuit considered cases from other circuits
that addressed the ability of unions to consent to drug testing or similar
searches on behalf of their members. 90 The First Circuit held that the
reasonableness of an employee's expectation of privacy largely de83. Id.

84. Id. The Third Circuit stated:
[T]here are a variety of circumstances in which a third party may validly
consent to a search or seizure. Such consent may be provided by an
agent to whom such authority has been conferred. In addition, consent
may be provided by certain other third parties with substantial interests
or responsibilities related to the search or seizure. These third parties
include.., a party with common authority over the premises or item to
be searched ....

Id. (citation omitted). For a discussion of the cases cited by the Third Circuit,
see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
85. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 826 ("[W]e believe that a union such as Bolden's
may validly consent to terms and conditions of employment, such as submission
to drug testing, that implicate employees' Fourth Amendment rights.").
86. Id. For a further discussion of the rights and obligations of unions in
Pennsylvania, see supra note 30.
87. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 827 (citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
88. For a more detailed discussion on the limited ability of unions to impinge on their members' First Amendment rights, see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
89. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 827 ("We see no reason why similar principles
should not be employed in determining whether a union, in its capacity as exclusive bargaining representative, may consent to terms and conditions of employment implicating Fourth Amendment interests.").
90. Id. ("Several courts of appeals in recent years have suggested that un-
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pended upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 9 1 The
Sixth Circuit also placed significant weight on the collective bargaining
agreement when determining whether the employee consented to locker
searches. 9 2 The Ninth Circuit stated that no precedent exists that forbids unions from negotiating away an employee's right to be free from
drug testing.9 3 The Bolden court further argued that the power of unions to consent to the drug testing of their members promotes
94
efficiency.
The Third Circuit next discussed the contexts in which unions can
consent to drug testing. 95 The Bolden court stated that a union could
expressly consent to drug testing through a collective bargaining agreement or such an agreement could implicitly permit drug testing. 9 6 The
Bolden court further stated that any interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement must be done in accordance with established procedures. 9 7 If the procedures require arbitration or grievance proceedings,
those proceedings must be utilized. 9 8 Through these proceedings a
union could concede that the collective bargaining agreement implicitly
permits employee drug testing.9 9 Courts are bound by that determination unless the employee can prove that the union breached its duty of
fair representation.10 0 The Bolden court held that Local 234, acting in its
ions, in negotiating collective bargaining agreements, may consent to drug testing or analogous searches on behalf of employees.").
91. Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111, 119 (1st Cir. 1988)
("[T]he dimensions of... cognizable expectation of privacy depend to a great
extent upon the concessions the union made regarding working conditions during collective bargaining.").
92. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 871 F.2d
556, 567 (6th Cir. 1989).
93. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 827 ("To the best of our knowledge .... no court

has held that the right to be free from drug testing is one that cannot be negotiated away, and we decline to make such a ruling here." (quoting Utility Workers
of America v. Southern California Edison, 852 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.
1988))).
94. Id. at 828 ("If individual public employees may litigate such questions

despite the resolution reached through collective bargaining, the utility of collective bargaining.., would be greatly diminished.").
95. Id. at 828-29.
96. Id. at 828. The court based its determination on the Supreme Court's
holding in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 491 U.S.

299, 311-12 (1989), holding that if a collective bargaining agreement lacked an
express provision permitting drug testing, it may implicitly allow for such tests
based on industry custom. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 828.
97. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 828.
98. Id. (citing DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151, 163 (1983)).
99. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 828 ("The result of this process may be a settlement
or arbitration decision that the.collective bargaining agreement implicitly permits drug testing of some or all employees.").
100. Id. (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558 (1990)).
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role as exclusive bargaining agent for its members, represented Bolden
in a grievance proceeding and negotiated a settlement that permitted
future drug testing.' 0 ' The Bolden court held that this settlement had
the same effect as a consent to the drug testing by Bolden himself.' 0 2
The court also concluded that a claim of unfair union representation was
not available to Bolden because he had not previously asserted that
claim at trial or on appeal.10 3 The Bolden court remanded the case to
determine the amount of damages representing lost wages and emotional distress arising after the grievance settlement.10 4 These damages
were unavailable to Bolden because he refused to return to work. 0 5
V.

CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit's holding that labor unions can waive their members' Fourth Amendment rights is confusing given the court's position
06
on drug testing as announced in the Bolden opinion and other cases.1
The Third Circuit has applied painstaking analysis to determine which
drug testing plans constitute unreasonable searches violative of the
Fourth Amendment.' 0 7 Yet, after determining that a drug testing plan
was unreasonable (specifically, SEPTA Order 87-2), the court stretched
the law of third-party consent so that an otherwise unconstitutional drug
test became mandatory for an unwilling individual.10 8
The cases cited by the Third Circuit majority in support of its position are distinguishable from Bolden. 109 Those cases involved drug test101. Id. at 828-29.
102. Id. at 829 (stating that "this settlement had the same effect under labor
law and under the Fourth Amendment as if Bolden himself had consented to
such future drug testing").
103. Id. ("[Tihe claim asserted against the union in Bolden's amended
complaint was not for breach of the duty of fair representation but for conspiring with SEPTA to violate his constitutional rights.").
104. Id. The jury verdict was not divided into separate awards for pre- and
post-settlement damages. Id.
105. Id.
106. In Bolden, the Third Circuit found SEPTA's drug testing unreasonable

because SEPTA did not have a compelling interest in testing an employee with

non-safety-sensitive duties. Id. at 821-24. For a discussion of the court's analysis of this issue, see supra note 3. For a discussion of other Third Circuit cases
addressing the constitutionality of drug testing, see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
107. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of the drug testing programs, see supra notes 19-23
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court's application of this framework in Bolden, see supra note 3.
108. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the third-party consent issue and its application in Bolden, see supra notes 83-102 and accompanying
text.
109. For a discussion of circuit court cases addressing the ability of unions
to consent to searches of union members, see supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
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ing programs and other searches that arguably promoted compelling
state interests not present in Bolden."10 More importantly, the employees in those cases had a diminished expectation of privacy because they
received prior express notice of the testing programs through their collective bargaining agreements. I I The respective circuit courts suggested that the searches were reasonable because the compelling state
interests outweighed the employees' diminished expectation of privacy.1 2 Because the searches were reasonable, they did not implicate
Fourth Amendment rights.' 3 Consequently, the unions did not consent to Fourth Amendment searches." 4 Rather, they consented to
searches that did not implicate the constitutional rights of their
members.' 15

The Third Circuit held that the drug testing of Bolden was unreasonable. 1 6 Therefore, the test implicated Bolden's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches. Based on precedent that
110. In Liquid Carbonic, the drug testing plan was instituted under a program to promote safety in interstate trucking, an industry with considerable
safety requirements. Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111, 116-17
(1st Cir. 1989). In American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,
USPS searched postal property to deter theft of mail items and to promote
safety. 871 F.2d 556, 557-58 (6th Cir. 1989). In Utility Workers of America v.
Southern California Edison, the utility instituted employee drug testing to ensure
the safety of nuclear power plants and the Ninth Circuit recognized the utility's
right to promulgate safety rules. 852 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1990). In Stikes
v. Chevron USA, Inc., Chevron instituted its employee search plan as part of an
overall safety program. 914 F.2d 1265, 1266 (9th Cir. 1990).
111. For a discussion of the circuit courts' findings regarding the notice
provided through the collective bargaining agreements, see supra notes 34-53
and accompanying text.
112. For a discussion of circuit courts' analyses of the reasonableness of the
respective searches, see supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
113. Judge Nygaard expounded this argument in his dissent from the Third
Circuit's finding that Local 234 could waive Bolden's constitutional rights.
Bolden, 953 F.2d at 832-34 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). Nygaard criticized the majority holding as confusing the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable
searches. Id. at 833 (Nygaard,J., dissenting). He further stated that "the majority thinks terms and conditions of employment embodied in collective bargaining agreements with public employers commonly restrict 'rights' that unionized
public employees would otherwise enjoy under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
(Nygaard, J., dissenting).
114. In his dissent, Judge Nygaard agreed with the majority that unions
possess the authority to consent to drug testing of their members through collectively-ratified bargaining agreements. Id. at 833 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
Nygaard stated that the unions had this authority "not because the union has
omnipotent authority under labor law, but because such medical incursions into
individual liberty are reasonable under the circumstances and hence do not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
115. Judge Nygaard further stated "the 'rights' properly restricted by collective bargaining agreements do not have constitutional dimensions, but rather
are in the nature of contractual entitlements." Id. (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
116. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of this issue, see supra
note 3.
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held that unions could consent to reasonable searches, the Third Circuit
held that Local 234 had the power to consent to an unreasonable search of
Bolden." 7 Bolden did not consent to the drug test he underwent upon
his return to work 1 8 and did not personally consent to drug testing as a
requirement for re-employment after his drug-related dismissal.'19
Under the Third Circuit's holding in Bolden, an individual can unknowingly waive his constitutional rights by joining a labor union. The
individual might not receive express notice of potential Fourth Amendment searches through the collective bargaining agreement or any other
form of official communication. After the employer unilaterally institutes a drug testing program that implicates the individual's Fourth
Amendment rights, the individual is denied an opportunity to withhold
consent to the program by asserting his constitutional rights. Instead,
the union becomes the governor of the individual's constitutional rights,
despite any of his or her contrary intentions.
Andrew M. Souder
117. For a more detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis and
holding, see supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
118. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's finding that Bolden did not consent to drug testing, see supra note 2.
119. For a discussion of Bolden's refusal to submit to a second drug test,
and his subsequent legal proceedings against SEPTA, see supra notes 71-78 and
accompanying text.
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